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Through the Flat Canvas: The Motor Meaning of 
Realistic Paintings 
Silvano Zipoli Caiani 
1. Introduction 
It is a common experience that objects in the environment indicate how we are to 
interact with them. For example, a door handle suggests an interaction based on whole-
hand grips, whereas a mug handle suggests that we interact with it by means of a 
precision grip. Additionally, the type of interaction that is suggested by an object is 
biased by our motor intentions and goals. A spoon, for example, suggests an inter-digit 
grip when we need to stir our coffee, but it suggests a clenched grip when we need to 
feed a baby.  
Over the last few decades, researchers in the cognitive science of vision have 
attempted to understand how we perceive the possibilities of action in our environment. 
With the increasing consensus regarding an embodied approach to cognition (e.g., 
Shapiro [2011] for a moderate view; Chemero [2009], for a more radical approach), it has 
become increasingly evident that perception is not only functional in the planning of 
action and execution, but also that our planning and execution of actions shape the way 
we perceive the environment (Hurley [2001], Noë [2004]). As a consequence of this view, 
perception and action should be understood as two intimately related cognitive 
processes, so that it is nowadays generally agreed that we access our perceptual 
experience through the lenses of our motor competence and goals. 
Although interactions between perception and action were the focus of the large and 
rapidly growing field of theoretical and empirical research in the past several decades, 
there are still divergences in the philosophical and experimental literature. An important 
point of controversy among scholars concerns the perception of action possibilities that 
are evoked by bi-dimensional representations of action-related objects such as pictures 
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and paintings. Notably, there is no consensus concerning how bi-dimensional 
representations suggest opportunities for action and what epistemic value pertains to 
such a sort of perception. The reason is that pictures and paintings do not allow for the 
execution of the actions that are suggested by the objects that they represent. This 
phenomenon raises the question of whether those possibilities for action that are 
evoked by bi-dimensional representations can be genuinely perceived or whether they 
are instances of mere illusions. 
It is common to conceive of an illusion as “any perceptual situation in which a 
physical object is actually perceived, but in which that object perceptually appears other 
than it really is” (Smith [2002]: 23). Thus, the perceptual experience of potential actions 
that are evoked by bi-dimensional representations can be regarded as an instance of 
illusory perception because the properties of objects as they are perceptually 
represented do not reflect the properties of objects as they actually are.  
Following this line of thought, James Gibson (1979) and later scholars (Turvey, et al., 
1981) have developed an influential framework that suggests that perceiving possibilities 
of action involves interacting with the action-related dispositional properties of the 
environment. According to this view, action possibilities in the environment are specified 
by the external structure of the ambient light array and are directly perceivable without 
the need for any internal representation. Consequently, because action-related 
information is obtained directly from the environment, a misrepresentation results in 
cases in which perceptual information does not reflect the environment.  
For Gibson, pictures and paintings should be understood nothing but as surfaces 
treated in such a way that a delimited optic array to an available point of observation 
contains the same type of information that is found in the natural array of light. 
However, this occurs without specifying the presence of any genuine environmental 
property (Gibson [1971]: 31). According to this view, because a picture or a painting of 
an object may contain false information concerning the presence of possible motor 
interactions that are not available in the nearby environment, the perceptual experience 
of pictures and paintings may be understood as a prototypical case of illusion. As a 
consequence, a significant part of our experience of works of art, such as works of 
photography, hyper-realistic painting or trompe l’oeil effects, should be understood as 
only an instance of false experience.  
However, there is a way to resist the temptation to write off a great deal of aesthetic 
experience as merely illusion. As an alternative to this view, we might begin by assuming 
that the attribution of motor meanings to perception is the natural way of making sense 
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of our perceptual experiences of the action-related three-dimensional objects that are 
situated in our natural environment. Consistent with this view, we can hypothesize that 
also the ascription of motor meanings to bi-dimensional objects is part of the natural 
way in which we pragmatically understand the system of representations that makes up 
our cultural environment.  
It is interesting to note that over the last decades, a large amount of evidence has 
been accumulated to support the view that our perceptual access to the world is 
substantially shaped by our motor abilities and intentions. In particular, it has been 
shown that the activation of the motor system plays a functional part in object 
perception, allowing for the pragmatic interpretation of our perceptual experience to 
plan and execute motor actions. Remarkably, the activation of the motor system during 
perceptual tasks does not distinguish between three-dimensional or bi-dimensional 
targets, rather, it appears to be functionally relevant in both cases. 
The aim of this paper is to maintain that the attribution of motor meanings to 
perceptual experience is not merely a matter of correspondence with the environment 
but is the way we commonly interpret and understand the motor significance of both 
real and represented objects. My argument is based on an analysis of a large amount of 
experimental data that show that the functional role of the motor system is pervasive in 
perceptual experience. Accordingly, the paper is divided into two parts. The first part 
introduces details concerning the dispositional account of perception. Here, I focus on 
the notion of affordance as it is developed within the ecological approach to perception 
that was discussed by Gibson and his scholars. Then, I show that this notion of 
affordance has serious consequences for our consideration of the way we understand 
the perceptual experience of pictures and paintings. The second part is devoted to an 
introduction of the dual-stream theory of perception, which stresses the role of 
pragmatic information in perception. In this section, I review the relevant evidence 
which shows that the activation of the motor system complements our conceptual 
knowledge and contributes to the way we provide meaning of our perceptual 
experience. Finally, considerations concerning the role of the motor system in meaning 
attribution and aesthetic experience will be outlined in the conclusions.  
2. The Dispositional Account of Affordance 
2.1 Affordances as Dispositional Properties  
After Gibson introduced the concept of affordance (Gibson [1966], [1979]), the nature 
and function of action in perception became a distinguished topic of research in many 
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areas of the cognitive sciences. According to Gibson, the motor meaning of objects in the 
environment is specified by the ambient array of light, so no internal information is 
required to complement the perceptual stimulus and execute a planned action. Gibson 
argued that the perception of objects consists of the detection of possible interactions 
without involving high-level cognitive skills such as reasoning about properties and 
categories.  
In particular, Gibson (1979) focused on the ambient array of light as the only source 
of perceptual information that specifies and makes available to the agent all of the visual 
information about the environment that is necessary for the agent’s survival. According 
to Gibson, the agent’s ability to pick up the information from the optic array does not 
require computation of internal representations. Importantly, the possibilities of action 
of any given object do not depend only on the intrinsic properties of the object, but also 
on the bodily properties of the perceiving agent. A hammer, for example, affords 
grasping actions for agents with hands that are endowed with opposable thumbs, but 
not for dogs, for which it might afford biting and licking. Moreover, in the case of object 
manipulation an agent who sees a tool does not notice its shape and colors and then 
infer its possible use; rather, he quickly and unreflectively perceives its properties against 
the motor- related properties of his body. The quickness that characterizes the 
perception of such motor properties, usually called affordances (Gibson [1979]), relates 
to the fact that sensing the environment is a dynamical interaction that does not involve 
conceptualization and propositional skills. In contrast, motor relatedness involves that 
perception is for action, and that our visual experience of the environment is shaped by 
the agent’s motor abilities, which are made available by his or her bodily shape (Gibson 
[1979]: Chap. 8). 
Among post-Gibsonian attempts to develop a theory of affordance the most 
influential is the view that considers affordances to be dispositional properties that 
pertain to objects that are complemented by an organism’s features (e.g., Turvey et al., 
[1981], Scarantino [2003]). There are many ways to conceive of a property in 
dispositional terms, but a commonly accepted definition frames dispositions in terms of 
counterfactual conditions and emphasizes the way in which things are disposed to 
behave given certain changes in the environmental circumstances. 
Typical cases of dispositional properties are the solubility of sugar when it is 
immersed in water at the proper concentration and temperature and the fragility of a 
piece of glass that is manifested by breaking events, such as when we hit a window with 
a ball. Importantly, all of the times that we attribute a dispositional property to a certain 
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object X, we also attribute a complementary property to another object or situation. In 
the case of the solubility of sugar, for example, it is necessary for water to have a solvent 
power to dissolve sugar, whereas in the case of the fragility of a glass window, it is 
necessary for the ball to be endowed with the correct amount of force and hardiness to 
break the window. 
Consistent with this definition of dispositionality, post-Gibsonian approaches to 
perception (e.g., Turvey, et al. [1981], Shaw et al. [1982]) have conceived of affordances 
as dispositions of objects that behave in a certain way given complementary conditions. 
Therefore, action-related affordances should be viewed as properties that pertain to a 
class of objects that, given the appropriate background circumstances, allow an organism 
that is endowed with suitable properties to execute a motor action. Accordingly, when 
there is a positive probability that an agent will act on a target, then the target should be 
considered to be the bearer of a dispositional property that is related to that agent and 
to that action. For example, the bottle that stands in front of me is the bearer of a 
grasping-related affordance for me if and only if there is some minimal positive 
probability that I will successfully grasp it in the future (Scarantino [2003]: 956, 959–
960).  
It should be noted that because an affordance is a property of the environment and 
its actualization gives rise to a possible action, for a dispositional account to perceive an 
affordance necessarily involves the presence of an object that allows the actualization of 
that action. Perceiving an affordance, therefore, depends on the presence of a property 
bearer that is appropriate for a related motor interaction with the environment, so that 
it becomes senseless to expect the actualization of an action without postulating the 
presence of a referent that is appropriate for the execution of that action. According to 
this view, to say that affordances are the dispositional properties of the en-vironment is 
to say that the environment and the agent’s body join in a single physical system (Turvey 
et al., 1981). Thus, to assess whether an object, such as a handle, actually affords a 
grasping action, the properties of the environ¬ment should be considered part of a 
coupling system with relevant properties of the agent’s body.  
2.2 Affordances and illusions 
According to dispositional theory (see § 2.1), an affordance is understood such that 
perceiving it cannot be divorced from the presence in the environment of a property 
bearer that is suitable for action. Following this line of reasoning, an attempt to perceive 
an affordance in the absence of an appropriate object that allows its actualization results 
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in a sort of contradiction. It is a general assumption of a dispositional view that either we 
perceive an affordance and a suitable target for action is truly present in the 
environment or that there are no actual possibilities of action in the immediate area, and 
thus we do not perceive a genuine affordance (note that this conclusion coincides with 
the main claim of the disjunctivist theory of perception: e.g., Austin [1962]; Haddock & 
Macpherson [2008], Brewer [2011]). 
The fact that the perception of the environment quickly evokes possible patterns of 
motor interactions is a natural antecedent of the planning and execution of motor 
actions. If this were not so — that is, if the perceptual experience of the environment 
were silent about how to interact with the objects around us — we would have serious 
difficulties in deciding how to take action. To understand this point, consider the 
following example. Suppose you are standing at a bar counter waiting for a coffee while 
chatting with your colleague. The discussion is quite involving, and your attention is 
entirely absorbed by a series of pointed arguments. Meanwhile, the barman places a 
mug of coffee in front of you. Soon you will have to decide how to grasp the mug to 
drink. This issue implies the identification of possible ways to interact with the mug, the 
selection of the most comfortable among these ways, and then the planning of how to 
actualize the selected interaction. Although they may seem to be demanding tasks, this 
is a common experience that does not require that we divert our attention from what 
are we doing to reach for the mug and drink the coffee. Grasping a mug while you chat 
with a friend, pulling a door handle while you remember our last holiday in Malaysia or 
grasping the gear lever of our car as you listen to the news on the radio are common 
examples in which perception successfully guides action without resorting to conscious 
cognitive abilities. 
However, it is also a common experience that sometimes perception goes wrong and 
presents confounding information about the source of our experience. Reliance on a 
successful visual experience is not always appropriate because it can occasionally lead to 
discrepancies between the actual and perceived properties of objects in the 
environment. The perception of possibilities of action is not free of this condition of 
uncertainty. For example, common errors regarding the perception for action concern 
the size of apertures that appear to be able to accommodate the passage of our body, 
but that may be revealed to be smaller than they appear or things that appear able to sit 
upright despite the fact that they are inappropriate for this purpose because they may 
be too soft or too fragile. 
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As a result, perception can guide us to the execution of incorrect actions, suggesting 
motor plans that might be unsuitable when they are compared to our intentions and 
goals. Remarkably, according to a dispositional view (see Section 2.1), because our visual 
experience suggests a potential for action that is not actually present in the 
environment, these cases are not genuine instances of affordance perception but rather 
cases in which we have a false experience of them.  
2.3 Affordances and art 
Our world is not made only of concrete three-dimensional objects that allow for 
potential actions. We are immersed in a cultural environment that is filled with flat 
representations that mimic the possibilities for action that are allowed by common 
three-dimensional objects. However, in contrast to three-dimensional objects, bi-
dimensional surfaces do not make available the interactions that are permitted by the 
objects that they represent. Pictures and drawings are cases of this type. For example, a 
picture of an apple may evoke a grasping action when viewed in particular 
circumstances. Similarly, a drawing of a door may suggest passage through a wall when it 
is observed from a particular distance and angle. Among these cases, the trompe l’oeil 
(“fool the eye”) effect is a well-known painting technique that uses bi-dimensional 
imagery to create an optical experience such that the depicted objects appear to exist in 
three dimensions and thus become possible targets of motor interaction. 
The trompe l'oeil technique has its roots in antiquity. Pliny the Elder’s “History of 
Nature”, for example, tells us the story of a rivalry between two painters, Zeuxis and 
Parrhasius. According to Pliny, Zeuxis was able to paint a representation of bunches of 
grapes that were so realistic that they attracted hungry birds that intended to eat them. 
Zeuxis’ rival Parrhasius was so impressed by this result that he asked Zeuxis to visit his 
studio to see his work. Zeuxis went to Parrhasius’ studio where he was intrigued by a 
painting that was draped by a curtain, but when he approached the painting and tried to 
pull the curtain back to reveal the canvas, he was surprised that the curtain was painted. 
Unfortunately, no examples of such works have survived, which makes it difficult to 
assess their similarity to the illusionistic paintings that began to fill the walls of churches 
and buildings from the Renaissance onward.  
A famous example of trompe l’oeil in this period is located in the church of Santa 
Maria presso San Satiro in Milan. The architect Donato Bramante was commissioned to 
create the illusion of space behind the altar that visually appeared to be three or four 
times deeper than it is in reality. Bramante was successful, and the area behind the altar, 
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which actually has a depth of only one meter due to the presence of a previously existing 
road behind the church, was replaced by the artist with a fresco that gives the illusion of 
a large room down to the main aisle. As a result, a spectator who enters the church has 
the perceptual experience of a possible walking path that extends through the wall in 
front of him, at least until he or she reaches a closer distance from the wall or moves 
toward one of the side aisles. In such cases, indeed, the pattern of optical stimulation 
changes its configuration and stops mimicking that of real spatial depth.  
Andrea Pozzo’s ceiling painting, the Apotheosis of St Ignatius, in the church of San 
Ignazio in Rome, is another famous example of trompe l’oeil .The actual form of the 
ceiling is cylindrical, but Pozzo was able to make it appear to be a dome. Pozzo left an 
extended documentation of how he conceived and constructed this illusion following the 
principles of perspective. The illusion of a dome-shaped room instead of a cylindrical 
room is successful because of the skillful way in which the artist integrated the structures 
of the building, such as walls and columns, with their painted continuations. However, 
the true shape of the ceiling becomes clear as soon as the spectator moves away from 
the ideal viewing point. The optical experience of a dome, indeed, is only accessible from 
one position that is marked by a star on the floor of the church, which is the point of 
view that allows the viewer to experience the patterns of optical stimulation of a real 
dome. Different points of view do not allow this pattern of stimulation. 
More recent examples of trompe l’oeil are paintings that were created by a group of 
American artists who were active in the late 19th century. Typical of these American 
trompe l’oeil paintings are William Harnett’s and John Peto’s oils on canvas, which are so 
striking in their realism that they are sometimes perceived as actual objects that hang on 
a wall. These American artists achieved their illusory effects not by the implementation 
of an original technique but by combining extremely fine and realistic renderings with a 
careful choice of subject matter. Their works demonstrate that skillful painting technique 
can induce a surrogate of the perceptual experience of three-dimensional objects 
without adding anything to the surface of a flat canvas. 
During the 20th century, American Hyperrealism was an art movement that 
represented an American inheritance of the trompe l’oeil tradition. Hyperrealist paintings 
create in the observer a tangible sense of physical presence and solidity of the depicted 
object through the accurate choice of lighting, shading effects and colors. The spectator 
usually experiences the details of the depicted object closest to the front of the painting, 
as if they appear just beyond the flat surface of the canvas, with more clarity than can be 
found in natural experience.  
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Among the contemporary hyperrealist painters, Jason de Graaf shows an interesting 
production of artworks that represent common objects on canvas but with an additional 
three-dimensional effect. The Canadian artist infuses the painting with a quality that 
pushes the spectator to search within the image for a clue to reveal its unreality; such 
clues, however, are almost impossible to find. Although de Graaf’s paintings may appear 
to be merely realistic representations of photos, the artist is able to create an illusion of 
depth and a sense of presence of objects that is not usually found in photographs. Things 
appear to be at the spectator’s fingertips, easily reachable and graspable, as in the case 
of the shiny balls that rest on the snow represented in “Ice Palace” or the group of 
glasses that are painted in “Vessels” (for a sense of de Graaf’s production, visit the 
artist’s website: http://jasondegraaf.blogspot.it/). 
The visual experience of one of de Graaf’s artworks, like the visual experience of the 
earlier examples of trompe l’oeil paintings, suggests the possibility of interaction with the 
depicted objects. This amounts to a sort of deception to which we voluntarily submit 
each time we choose to observe a hyperrealistic painting or a classical trompe l’oeil 
rendering. Interestingly, when we approach these types of artworks we know that we are 
facing nothing more a bi-dimensional representation, but we are nevertheless subject to 
the same illusionary effect: we have the perceptual experience of possibilities of action 
that are not actually present in the environment. In other words, our experience induces 
us to judge the environment as endowed with affordances that, paradoxically, are not 
available to us. How is it that we let ourselves be fooled by a trick, when we are perfectly 
aware of the deceptive nature of the artwork? 
To answer this question, we must rethink the illusory nature of our perceptual 
interaction with bi-dimensional representations of objects such as trompe l’oeil and 
hyperrealistic paintings. Many findings from the cognitive sciences of vision address the 
functioning of the perceptual apparatus and reveal the importance of experiencing 
possibilities of action even when they are not actually available in the environment. To 
illustrate this point, I will present some evidence below.  
3. The Informational Account of Perception for Action 
3.1 Bi-dimensional Representations and Behavioral Effects 
We are always surrounded by bi-dimensional representations of objects that perceptual 
experience suggests to us as a plurality of possible interactions that are not present in 
the environment. Accordingly, because the perception of possible interactions with the 
environment is quick and motor related (Section, 2.1), one may hypothesize that the 
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action-related value of bi-dimensional representations could be immediately obtained by 
the observer with regard to his or her bodily motor properties.  
According to this view, the detection of specific patterns of interaction in the 
perceptual experience of a bi-dimensional representation of an object might influence 
the planning and the execution of actions according to the possibilities that are evoked 
by the represented object. This is precisely the case that is illustrated by much of the 
behavioral evidence concerning the perception of affordances, which shows that 
compatibility effects occur when agents are asked to execute a motor task that is 
congruent with one of the possible actions afforded by the visual target (Ellis & Tuker 
[2000]). What follows is a brief elaboration on this concept. 
In influential research conducted by Tucker and Ellis (1998), subjects were presented 
with images of graspable targets and asked to specify whether the depicted objects, such 
as mugs, pans and other action-related objects, were right-side up or upside down by 
pressing keys on a keyboard using their left or right hands. This experiment showed that 
a significant facilitation effect occurred when the hand used in the response was that of 
the same side of the action-related parts of the observed object (e.g., the handle of a 
mug), even though the horizontal object orientation was irrelevant to the assigned task. 
The same type of compatibility effect that is related to the perception of affordances has 
been found when the image of a single target is presented in a set of many others rather 
than on its own (Derbyshire et al. 2006). Interestingly, Costantini et al. (2010) showed 
that this type of compatibility effect is strictly related to an individual’s apparent 
possibility of interacting with a visual target. To test the hypothesis that what is relevant 
in perception for action is the detection of patterns of motor interaction with the 
environment, the authors divided the depicted space into both reachable and non-
reachable subspaces by showing the image of a mug either in front of or behind the 
image of a transparent panel. The authors found a compatibility effect only when the 
image of the target was apparently reachable by the observer, that is when it was 
apparently located within the subject’s peripersonal space. A similar result was achieved 
in another experiment conducted by Vainio et al. (2011), which revealed the presence of 
a compatibility effect when an agent executed actions while observing the image of a 
graspable object but not when he or she observed the orientation of a depicted arrow. 
This evidence also suggests that the perceptual experience of a bi-dimensional 
representation of an object can evoke possible interactions with the environment and 
influence the execution of motor actions that are concomitant or immediately 
subsequent to perception. Interestingly, the visual detection of action possibilities in 
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images of common objects influences spatial attention even when the subject’s ability to 
recognize the identity of the perceptual targets is not involved in the task or even 
disrupted. Handy, et al. (2003), for example, showed that normal subjects who are 
presented with images of action-related targets automatically direct their attention in 
the visual hemifield that is dominant for the execution of the suggested action, re-
allocating their attention in the direction of the suggested motor interaction. 
Experiments performed on patients who suffer from specific brain lesions that impair 
attention are particularly significant to illustrate this phenomenon. For example, patients 
who suffer from extinction are an interesting target for experiments that aim to assess 
the interaction between perception and action. Extinction patients show a deficit in 
visual attention to stimuli that are presented toward the contralesional side of the space 
while competing stimuli appear further to the other side. However, Di Pellegrino et al. 
(2005) showed that contralateral extinction was significantly reduced in patients who 
were presented with images of pairs of cups that were endowed with handles in both of 
the visual fields, but no reduction was registered when the cups were deprived of their 
functional part. This means that it is easier for the image of a cup that is endowed with a 
handle to elicit the experience of possible motor interactions, enabling appropriate 
reports of its presence in the perceptual field. This type of evidence suggests that 
information concerning the presence of possible actions in the surrounding space can be 
extracted even when the observer is not able to semantically recognize the target 
identity, suggesting that categorization and identification abilities are not necessary for 
the detection of action possibilities (see also Riddoch [2003]). 
3.2 Bi-Dimensional Representations and Motor System Activations 
The behavioral evidence that seeing the representation of action-related objects induces 
modification of the agent’s behavioral response to the stimulus calls attention to the role 
of the motor system in perceptual processing. According to a general hypothesis (Gallese 
& Sinigaglia [2011]), if perceptual information and motor intentions are coded together, 
it becomes possible to account for motor and attentional facilitations that characterize 
the perception of real objects and bi-dimensional images of common targets of action. 
Consistent with this view, a great deal of evidence supports the hypothesis that visually 
presented images of action-related objects activate the same cortical areas that are 
functionally implicated in the planning and execution of those actions afforded by 
represented objects. 
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For example, in a classic experiment, Grafton et al. (1997) assess whether observing and 
naming frequently used tools elicit premotor areas even in the absence of any overt 
motor task. As expected, the findings show that the observation and naming tools 
activates the left dorsal premotor cortex, which is the area of the brain that is normally 
involved in planning motor interactions with the environment. This result is confirmed by 
another classic study conducted by Chao and Martin (2000). In this experiment, the 
subjects were visually presented with different categories of objects while they were 
scanned in an fMRI machine. The findings clearly reveal the sensitiveness of the left 
ventral premotor cortex for pictures of tools, which supports the hypothesis that the 
ability to detect motor-related information in a perceptual stimulus may depend on the 
function of the same cortical regions related to planning motor interactions with the 
environment.  
Experiments based on transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) can be used to assess 
where and when the activation of the motor system occurs during the observation of bi-
dimensional representations of action-related objects. In an experiment conducted by 
Buccino et al. (2009), motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) from an area of the hand that is 
involved in grasping actions were recorded while the participants were presented with 
images of objects characterized by a whole or a broken handle. At the same time, the 
participants’ left hand motor area in the brain was stimulated 200 ms after the visual 
stimulus presentation. Interestingly, the results show that at this early stage of the 
processing, the MEPs were larger when the whole handle was located ipsilaterally to the 
monitored hand than when the graspable part was broken or located on the 
contralateral side. In another TMS experiment, Cardellicchio et al. (2011) showed that 
MEPs can be modulated by the orientation of the action-related part of the object, as in 
the previous case, and by its spatial location within or without the observer’s 
peripersonal space.  
To summarize, imaging and TMS experiments support the hypothesis that the 
perception of the potential for action results in a somatotopic involvement of the motor 
apparatus. This allows for a matching between optical patterns of stimulation and the 
perceiver’s vocabulary of motor acts (Rizzolatti, et al., 1988), which is already at a very 
early stage of the perceptual process. This finding lends empirical support to the idea 
that perceiving bi-dimensional representations of objects may consist of picking up 
sensorimotor patterns of optical stimulation that elicit specific motor representations, 
even in cases in which no action-related dispositional property is present locally.  
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3.3 The Pragmatic Meaning of Visual Perception 
Over the last few decades, great progress has been made toward a better understanding 
of the mechanism that underlies our ability to visually detect action possibilities in the 
environment. A major discovery was that a large part of neurons in the premotor area 
transforms the visual layout properties of objects in the appropriate information for 
motor execution (Rizzolatti et al. [1988], Rizzolatti & Luppino [2001]). These 
“visuomotor” neurons are characterized by the specific selectivity for certain solids as 
opposed to others; the difference between them depends on the type of grip that is 
afforded by those objects. Further evidence (Sakata et al. [1995], Murata et al. [1997], 
[2000]) demonstrates that the same sensorimotor selectivity is present in the anterior 
intraparietal area, which projects its connections in the premotor cortex (Borra et al. 
[2008]). A large part of the neurons in this area discharges during object fixation and is 
selective for action-related properties, such as the object’s shape, size, and orientation 
(Verhoef et al. [2010]).  
Interestingly, the above-mentioned evidence has been commonly interpreted as 
supporting a dual stream model of visual processing (Milner & Goodale [1995], Jacob & 
Jeannerod [2003]). According to this now-classic model, the dorsal pathway and the 
ventral pathway perform two different functions along the course of visual information 
processing. The dorsal stream extracts sensorimotor information from the perceptual 
stimulus, which allows for the detection of a series of affordances distributed on a visual 
map (Goodale & Milner [1992], Rizzolatti & Luppino [2001]). Concurrently, the ventral 
pathway assigns an identity to visual patterns, which provides for effective detection and 
selection of action possibilities in the environment according to the agent’s motor 
intentions and goals. Accordingly, dorsal and ventral representations of action-oriented 
objects come apart in two different ways: the latter supports our semantic recognition 
abilities, whereas the former helps us to detect possibilities of action in the environment 
to guide our motor interactions with visual targets.  
Remarkably, the dorsal stream performs transformations that convert information 
about the shape and the location of the stimulus’ source into parameters that are 
suitable for action planning and execution. Along this path, indeed, different areas may 
concurrently represent information that involves several possibilities of action, each of 
which has a different salience and probability (Cisek & Kalaska [2010]). In line with this 
finding, Baumann et al. (2009) provide compelling evidence that the multiple 
possibilities of action that are offered by a single object can evoke the activation of 
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different grasp-related areas in the anterior intra-parietal cortex. This finding suggests 
that this portion of the brain encodes information about the variety of visual features 
that are related to possible actions that the agent may be able to address to the same 
target. 
In light of the abovementioned evidence, there are good reasons to suggest that 
perceptual access to the motor value of bi-dimensional representations of objects is 
obtained through the dorsal processing of visual information (Nanay [2015]). If we 
consider that the attribution of motor relevance to depicted surfaces relies on the same 
dorsal processing by means of which we attribute motor salience to three-dimensional 
objects, we can explain why the perception of images of action-related objects 
influences motor behavior. More precisely, because the network of sub-streams that 
constitute the dorsal pathway automatically map the information that is contained in the 
perceptual stimulus on a specific motor plan for action (Gallese & Sinigaglia [2011]), real 
and represented objects can evoke the same perceptual experience of possible 
interactions with the environment. Notably, the information processing that occurs 
within the dorsal pathway subserves the detection of patterns of optical stimulation that 
are associated with action opportunities without distinguishing between three-
dimensional and bi-dimensional sources of stimulation. 
We have seen that the dorsal stream does not process information concerning the 
identity of the visual target because this latter role is primarily allocated to the ventral 
stream. The function of the dorsal stream is not to provide visual targets with an 
objective identity but rather to attribute motor meanings to the patterns of optical 
stimuli that continuously reach our eyes, which allows pragmatic access to the visual 
perception of the environment. Accordingly, because the motor representations that are 
processed in the dorsal stream do not assign an objective identity to the visual target, it 
is incorrect to consider them in terms of true or false statements about something 
(Butterfill & Sinigaglia [2013]) 
4. Concluding Remarks: seeing images and understanding language 
Some realistic images of objects actually cause their observers to question reality. These 
images, which are exemplified by the implementation of trompe l’oeil techniques and 
hyperrealistic paintings, not only instill doubts about reality but also demonstrate how a 
work of art can be powerful and effective. Some paintings are able to mimic the real 
environment to such an extent that the spectator cannot avoid feeling completely 
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absorbed by the subject, which induces in observers the experience of a reality that is 
not actually accessible. But what exactly are realistic paintings?  
According to a dispositional approach to visual perception (Section, 2), realistic 
paintings should be conceived as bi-dimensional representations of objects that are 
treated in such a way that the optic array that originates from them mimics the same 
optical array that is originated by the real objects that they represent (Gibson [1971], 
[1979]). Following this line of thought, the painting of a graspable object mimics the 
same optical patterns that are generated by a real graspable object despite the fact that 
the properties of the two things are very different. Whereas the visual array of a real 
graspable object specifies the disposition to be grasped of the object, the same optical 
array generated by the depicted representation of the same object does not relate to a 
disposition to be grasped. Thus, on the basis of a dispositional view, because the 
patterns of optical stimulation induced by a bi-dimensional representation of an object 
contain only false information about the presence of possible motor interactions with 
the represented object, the perceptual experience of realistic paintings might be 
understood as a mere case of illusion.  
However, recent findings in the cognitive science of vision suggest that the illusory 
character of our perceptual experience of bi-dimensional representations, such as 
trompe l’oeil and hyperrealistic paintings, is only part of the story. Our perceptual 
apparatus is organized such that there is a functional portion of this system that is 
specialized in detecting patterns of stimulation that are normally, but not necessarily, 
associated with the presence of action possibilities in the environment (Section 3). This 
functional specialization is made possible by the reuse of motor representations that are 
also involved in action execution, without a distinction between three-dimensional and 
bi-dimensional causes of the stimulation. Without this visuo-motor specialization of the 
perceptual apparatus, it would be virtually impossible to assign so quickly a motoric 
meaning to the objects in the environment and to pragmatically access the manifold 
systems of representation that constitute our cultural environment.  
Among such systems, the use of words may be the most abstract way to represent 
the concrete objects on a format that is not three-dimensional. As with pictorial 
representations, the use of words is semantically associated with the presence of 
possibilities of action in the environment despite the fact that no motor interaction is 
made available by linguistic items. Evidence derived from cognitive linguistics shows that 
our understanding of action-related words and verbs relies on motoric cognitive schemas 
that are encoded by the sensorimotor apparatus (Lakoff & Johnson [1999], Peruzzi 
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[2000a], [2000b]). Interestingly, theories concerning the evolution of language suggest 
that pragmatic abilities are the cognitive source of semantic abilities, establishing a 
primacy of motoric understanding in the abstract categorization of the world (Corballis 
[2002], Arbib [2012]). According to this view, our ability to give significance to linguistic 
gestures has its origin in our ability to understand others’ actions by means of a 
sensorimotor matching system which codifies the gestures of others in terms of one’s 
own vocabulary of motor act (Rizzolatti & Arbib [1998]).  
It is nowadays well known that pre-motor regions involved in action planning are 
activated both when the agent is involved in the execution of an action, as well as when 
she is involved in understanding motor-related concepts. Several studies devoted to 
investigate the correspondences between language comprehension and cerebral cortical 
activations support the idea that part of the process underlying semantic understanding 
is grounded in the sensorimotor system (see Borghi, & Binkofski [2014], for a review). A 
pivotal evidence supporting this view has been provided by Buccino et al. (2005) where 
the authors have shown a decrease of motor evoked potentials (MEPs) recorded from 
hand muscles and leg muscles when agents were required to process, respectively, hand-
related verbs and foot-related verbs. Moreover, using brain-imaging techniques, it has 
been established that when agents process words and sentences with contents related 
to effectors, such as hands and feet, somatotopic activations of pre-motor and motor 
cortical areas occur (Hauk et al. [2004]; Tettamanti et al. [2005]). In the same vein, Aziz-
Zadeh, et al. (2006) have shown that reading sentences describing hand actions activate 
the same premotor areas as watching videos that show an actress performing a manual 
action, revealing the involvement of the mirror system in language processing (Gallese 
[2008]). Importantly, it has been shown that the activation of effectors-related areas of 
the motor system occurs in the early phase of processing (Glenberg & Gallese [2012]), 
supporting the hypothesis that motor effects during language processing do not merely 
reflect the agent’s imagery after language understanding is completed (Gallese & Lakoff 
[2005]).  
More recently, Vega, et al., (2014), have shown that processing action-related 
sentences elicits stronger activations than visual sentences in the primary motor area, as 
well as in regions generally associated with the planning and understanding of actions. 
Interestingly, these motor activations occur not only with affirmative cases (e.g., I 
unwrapped the gifts), but also with negations (e.g., I did not unwrap the gifts) and with 
counterfactuals cases (e.g., I would have unwrapped the gifts), suggesting that the motor 
system is involved in language understanding by default, even when the actions 
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described by the sentences are not happening or merely hypothetical. Following this 
result, Marino, et al. (2014), have demonstrated that processing images and nouns of 
natural graspable objects share the same neural substrate, eliciting the same motor 
responses during a semantic recognition task. This evidence supports the hypothesis that 
the recruitment of the motor system during the presentation of images and nouns is 
crucial to perform semantic tasks, allowing a pragmatic access to both the figurative and 
the linguistic representations of action related objects. 
To conclude, it should be noted that, although hearing action-related words and verbs 
induces a somatotopic activation of the motor system that is congruent with the action 
possibility to which they refer, the perception of such linguistic items is not treated as a 
mere case of illusion. Instead, according to an embodied approach to language 
processing, the activation of the motor system is viewed as a constitutive part of the 
cognitive mechanism underlying the understanding of action-related words and 
sentences. This consideration, should be extended to the perceptual experience of bi-
dimensional representations of action-related objects, in particular to those instances of 
works of art aiming at inducing a sense of reality in the spectator.  
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